Turnover Per Race Is Falling Faster Than Headline Figures Suggest
The headline number gets the attention, but it is the per-race figure that tells the real story. Total betting turnover on UK horse racing fell 4.3% in 2025 compared to 2024. That sounds manageable — a single-digit decline in a volatile market. But the average turnover per race dropped 5.6% year-on-year, and the cumulative picture is worse: turnover per race is now 11.6% below 2023 levels. The total pot is shrinking, and it is shrinking faster at the race-by-race level than the aggregates suggest because the number of races has not fallen at the same rate.
I have been tracking these figures for years, and the trajectory is unmistakable. Every year since 2022, the line has moved in the wrong direction. Online horse racing betting turnover has dropped by 1.6 billion pounds since that year, and when you adjust for inflation, the real-terms deficit sits at approximately 3 billion pounds — a figure that Racing Post analysts have described as a financial black hole at the heart of the industry.
Year-on-Year Turnover Data: 2022 to 2025
The data builds a clear picture when you lay it out chronologically. Turnover on UK horse racing was at a relative high in 2022, boosted by post-pandemic recovery and a competitive betting market. The first significant decline appeared in 2023, when turnover per race began falling in the mid-single digits. By Q1 2025, total turnover had dropped 9% compared to the same period in 2024, with the average turnover per race in core fixtures — the midweek bread-and-butter of the calendar — falling 14.4%. Premier fixtures (the big Saturday cards and festivals) held steady, suggesting that casual money is concentrating around fewer, bigger events while the everyday product loses ground.
The HBLB’s annual report for FY2024-25 provides a wider lens: betting turnover per race fell 8% year-on-year, 15% compared to FY2022-23 and 19% compared to FY2021-22. Those are not cyclical dips. They represent a structural contraction in the amount of money being wagered on individual races. Richard Wayman, the BHA’s Director of Racing, has stated plainly that the decline in betting revenue is primarily driven by the impact of affordability checks, which either stop people betting entirely or push them to unlicensed operators.
The distinction between total turnover and per-race turnover is worth emphasising. The racing programme has not contracted at the same rate as turnover — the number of fixtures and races staged each year has remained relatively stable. That means the declining pot of money is being spread across a similar number of races, which depresses the per-race figure more sharply than the aggregate. For punters, per-race turnover is the more meaningful metric because it reflects the liquidity and competitiveness of the individual markets you are betting into.
The paradox sitting alongside these numbers is that the levy — funded by 10% of bookmaker GGY on British racing — reached a record 108.9 million pounds in the same period. The levy is rising because bookmaker margins are widening even as turnover falls. Fewer punters are betting, but the bookmakers are keeping a larger share of each pound staked. That is a dangerous equilibrium: it masks the underlying weakness in volume and creates a false sense of financial security.
Affordability, Competition and Product Appeal: Three Drivers of Decline
The affordability check regime is the most cited cause, and the data supports the connection. Since the threshold dropped to 150 pounds in net deposits per month in February 2025, millions of regular bettors fall within its scope. The Racing Post survey found that 23.7% of bettors experienced checks in 2025, nearly double the 2023 figure. Among those who were checked, a meaningful proportion reduced their betting or stopped entirely. Richard Wayman has directly attributed the turnover decline to these checks, and the BHA’s modelling shows the impact is not temporary — it is cumulative, with each year of restricted betting compounding the revenue loss.
But affordability is not the only factor. Competition from other sports betting markets is the second driver. Football, in particular, has grown its share of online betting revenue consistently. Remote football betting GGY reached 1.3 billion pounds in FY2024-25, compared to 766.7 million for horse racing. The football product is simpler, more heavily marketed and accessible to a global audience. Horse racing, with its complex form analysis and specialist terminology, has a steeper learning curve that works against casual acquisition.
Product appeal is the third factor — and the hardest to quantify. The number of horses in training dropped to 21,728 in 2025, a 2.3% decline that feeds into smaller field sizes. Smaller fields mean fewer betting opportunities, tighter markets and less scope for each-way value. A seven-runner handicap at Catterick on a Wednesday afternoon generates a fraction of the betting interest of a 20-runner handicap at Newbury on a Saturday. As the horse population contracts, the supply of competitive, large-field races — the races that drive betting volume — shrinks with it.
The interaction between these three drivers is what makes the problem structural. Affordability checks suppress demand. Competition redirects remaining demand away from racing. A shrinking product reduces the supply of attractive betting opportunities. Each factor reinforces the others. Addressing turnover decline requires action on all three fronts, not just one — and as the levy paradox shows, the financial indicators that appear healthy on the surface may be masking the scale of the underlying challenge.
